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Abstract
We explore the impact of mentoring of females and gender segregation on wages using
a large longitudinal data set for Portugal. Female managers can protect and mentor female
employees by paying them higher wages than male-led rms would do. We nd that females
can enjoy higher wages in female-led rms, the opposite being true for males. In both cases
is a higher share of females reducing the wage level. These results are compatible with a
theory where job promotion is an important factor of wage increases: if more females are to
be mentored, less promotion slots are available for males, but also the expected chance of a
female to be promoted is lower.
Keywords: female entrepreneurs; wages; gender gap; matched employer-employee data.
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Females get lower pay for equal work, as detected by numerous studies that looked
at possible reasons for this gender wage gap. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer
(2005) presented a meta-analysis of 263 international gender pay gap studies and
found that females earned in the 1990s on average 26% less than males; when
decomposing this earnings gap into a productivity-related component and an un-
explained component, they found an unexplained gender pay gap of 19% (p. 483).
This pay gap shrank in the last 40 years { taking dierent methods of data collec-
tion and analysis into account { only by 0.17 percentage points per year. Recent
studies explain these trends to a certain degree with labor market institutions
and general inequality (Blau and Kahn, 2003) as well as competition and equal
treatment laws (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2007).
Surprisingly, a less explored route is the role of supervisors, managers and en-
trepreneurs. Already Becker's taste for discrimination theory (1957) gives the
employer a paramount role: as employers set wages, looking at male and female
employers would shed some light on taste-based discrimination. Recent policy
measures in various countries are along these lines: while in the past equal oppor-
tunities and equal treatment laws were the main focus, more recently the impo-
sition of gender quotas or gender parity in top positions has dominated political
discussions. Promoting or hiring more females to top and in
uential positions is
meant to break the glass ceiling1 for females: it is expected that female decision
makers might hire more subordinate females, mentor them and pay them better
wages.
Despite these arguments, the empirical literature about the impact of female
bosses on gender hiring and pay gaps is small. This topic has mainly been taken up
by social psychologists, who distinguish between the similarity-attraction paradigm
(Byrne 1971) and the self-enhancement drive (Graves and Powell, 1995). While
the former claims that individuals who are similar are attracted to each other,
the latter states that groups of lower status tend to identify with members of the
higher status group.2 We are only aware of three studies looking at wage eects of
1Evidence on a glass ceiling (higher wage gaps at higher levels) is available in Albrecht et al. (2003) for Sweden
and in Arulampalam et al. (2005) for European countries.
2Almost all studies in management and social psychology relate to hiring decisions, experiments or evaluations
1female managers: Bell (2005) shows that in rms led by women (CEOs, chairs, and
directors) the gender gap between men and women executives is narrowed. Cohen
and Human (2007) use aggregate data on female managers in particular industries
to look at wages of non-managerial workers; they nd that industries with a higher
percentage of female managers pay lower wages to both sexes. Hultin and Szulkin
(2003) nd for Sweden that a strong male representation among organizational
managers is correlated with wider gender wage gaps.3
In this paper we focus on the impact of female leadership on the wages the rm
pays to its male and female workers and investigate whether the gender of the man-
ager of a rm has a signicant impact on gender wage dierences.4 A remarkable
longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset is used, which covers the whole
manufacturing and service non-public sector in Portugal for more than ten years.
The longitudinal character of our data allows us to use rm-xed eects. The
impact of female managers is thus identied by situations where a change in man-
agement resulted in a dierent gender of the manager; uncontrollable structural
rm attributes can so be eliminated.
In particular, we want to test the hypothesis that female-led rms tend to
protect and mentor female employees by paying them higher wages than male-
led rms would. Typically, discrimination theories do not see a role for female
entrepreneurs to pay higher wages for female workers. Start for simplicity with an
equilibrium where all rms consist of an equal share of males and females, but the
males enjoy a higher wage. If taste-based discrimination is the reason for lower
females' wages, non-discriminatory female-employers would have a clear incentive
to increase the share of female workers and thus increase their prots. They do
better hiring only women, and even more so if they have a "taste" for working
with them.
of recruiters, e.g. Graves and Powell (1995), Bon Reis et al. (1999), Heilman et al. (1988), Goldberg (2005), with
mixed results. One recent extensive study by Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2007) looks at recruitment committees
for Spanish public service positions and nds that female recruiters treat female candidates more disfavorably.
3Economists have studied the in
uence of gender on their own profession in some detail: Broder (1993)
nds that female reviewers of economics proposals for National Science Foundation grants grade proposals from
females lower; Blank (1991) nds no gender-dierence of referees for the American Economic Review and Hilmer
and Hilmer (2007) and Neumark and Gardecki (1998) investigate mentoring by economics PhD advisors: working
with a female advisor relative to a male one has practically no eect on early-career outcomes of young female
economists.
4See e.g. Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Bell (2005) or Lausten (2005) for an analysis of gender wage gaps for
managers themselves and Smith et al. (2005) for eects of female managers on rm performance.
2Considering wages, it is not clear why female-led rms should pay females wages
higher than the going rate. First, it is unnecessary to attract workers from the
market, second, paying higher females' wages would reduce prots. If female-led
rms would { due to e.g. fairness reasons or a positive "taste" for working with
females { want to pay women above the market rate, they could only do so, if i)
they do not equalize females' wages to the male level completely and ii) increase
the share of still cheaper females in their workforce; only in such a case, the total
wage bill would not rise as compared to the standard of a discriminating rm.
This reasoning would thus predict a higher potential for gender wage equalization
in rms where the share of female workers is very high. Segregation as such is
seen by many studies as a sign of bad jobs: rms with a high share of minorities
or females might generally pay lower wages. 5
On the other hand, mentoring (Brown and Scandura, 1994) of females in female-
led rms might take the form of helping females to climb up the corporate ladder,
to lead them into on-the-job training and networks. As mentoring is costly and
time-consuming, it might not be possible to mentor all females equally in the rm:
we would thus observe that female-led rms with a very high share of women in the
workforce have a harder time to mentor and protect female workers. Moreover,
if female-led rms' mentoring is part of non-market based favoritism for female
workers, we would observe that protection and mentoring of females is less possible
the higher the female-share in the rm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3
presents descriptive evidence on female- and male-led rms in Portugal. Results of
the econometric estimations are reported in Section 4, before concluding comments
in Section 5.
5The literature on the impact of gender segregation across rms on wages has shown mixed results. Evidence
by Carrington and Troske (1995) and Bayard et al (2003) for the US shows that the concentration of women into
lower-paying establishments contributes to the gender pay gap. Carrington and Troske (1995) show that a higher
proportion of women in a rm is associated with lower wages, both for females and for males, whereas results by
Vieira et al (2005), using data on Portugal, indicate that a higher concentration of women in a rm is associated
with lower females' wages but higher males' wages.
32 Data set and concepts used
2.1 Data set
The study is based on a linked employer-employee dataset gathered annually by
the Ministry of Employment in Portugal, which covers the population of private
rms with wage-earners in manufacturing and services. The years 1987 to 2000
are used.6 Given the legally binding nature of the inquiry, the response rate is
extremely high.
Reported data include the rm's location, industry, employment, sales, owner-
ship, legal setting, and the worker's gender, age, occupation, professional status,
schooling, date of admission into the company, skill, monthly earnings and dura-
tion of work. For owners of the rm, labor earnings and hours of work are not
reported.
Workers aged 16 to 65, full-time wage-earners or owners of the company, are the
focus of attention. Firms in manufacturing and the services in mainland Portugal,
employing at least 10 full-time wage-earners in any one year, were kept for analysis.
The size restriction leads to dropping a large share of rms in Portugal, but a small
share of the workforce, as reported in Table 6 in the appendix.
2.2 Identication of female-led rms
To identify the person(s) leading the rm, the following variables were considered:
1. Owner of the rm. The variable professional status is coded as: owner, wage-
earner, unpaid family member, or member of a cooperative. Owners are
reported if they are actually \performing functions in the rm". Thus, if
the owner is actively engaged working for the rm, his/her identication is
straightforward.
2. Top manager. The variable occupation is coded at the six-digit level using the
Portuguese Classication of Occupations version 1994. Top managers were
dened as the occupations \corporate directors and chief executives" (code
121) and \directors of small rms" (code 131).
6However, for 1990 no worker data are reported.
43. Middle manager. Using also the variable occupation, middle managers were
dened as \other managers" (codes 122 and 123), which includes directors of
production, nance and administration, marketing, sales, human resources,
etc.
4. Best wage in the rm. The worker(s) with the top wage in the rm was
identied.
The rst criterion { owner of the rm { provides an unambiguous identication
of the person(s) leading the rm. Almost half the rms report information on
their owner(s) and one fourth reports just one owner. In these cases, the share of
females in the rm leadership was quantied using simply the gender composition
of the owner(s).
Given that the dataset reports very detailed occupations, we have a clear idea
of the tasks performed by each individual. Almost all owners are declared as
managers of the rm (7% as top managers, i.e. corporate directors or directors of
small rms, and 85% as middle rank managers), suggesting this occupation as the
key one in terms of rm leadership. Note also that rms whose owner is reported
working in the rm tend not to have wage-earners as top managers.7 Therefore,
whenever the rm owner was not reported, an alternative procedure was followed
to identify the rm leader(s), relying on its salaried managers. We rst relied on
the top manager; if the rm did not have any top managers, we progressed to
consider middle rank managers.
For rms whose leadership could not be identied using either the owner or
manager criteria, we have considered a third criterion, the best paid worker(s)
as the one(s) leading the rm. The share of females leading the rm was then
collapsed into a dichotomous classication: female- and male-led rms.8
To summarize, in practice the procedure was implemented as follows. Beginning
with the owners, a rm was dened as female-headed if over 50% of its owners
were female (similarly, as male-headed if over 50% of owners were male; and not
classied if insucient information was available, i.e. if exactly half the owners
were male and half female or no owners were reported). For rms with insucient
7Just 1% of the rms with the owner present have wage-earners as top managers.
8Results do not change qualitatively if we use the share of female managers instead.
5information on the above criterion, a similar procedure was followed using the
variable top management. Next, the procedure was extended to middle managers
and nally, if none of the above criterion was conclusive, females among the top
wage in the rm were considered. Table 1 reports the classication of rms into
male- and female-led as these successive criteria were considered. Appendix B
reports the results of robustness checks on our classication of rms into female-
and male-led once alternative procedures are used.
Firms not classied as either male- or female-led were dropped from the analysis.
Moreover, some rms change classication over time. Since wage and other rm
outcomes may re
ect the choices of past management, specially in a regulated
labor market such as the Portuguese, rms that change classication may bring
noise into the analysis, a problem that is particularly acute if the rm changed
classication more than once, back and forth. Therefore, in the rst analysis
that follows, only rms that changed classication never or only once, maintaining
the same classication afterwards, were kept for analysis.9 This condition led to
dropping 24% of the observations on male-led rms and 49% on female-led rms.
As robustness checks we will report results on other alternatives for rm selection.
2.3 Wages
Gross monthly earnings are dened as monthly base-wage plus seniority-indexed
components of pay and other regularly paid benets. Wages were de
ated using
the Consumer Price Index (base 2000) and wage outliers have been dropped.10
Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix provide descriptive statistics on the rm and
worker datasets.
3 Women-led rms and men-led rms in Portugal
Women tend to lead smaller rms, with a strong sectoral concentration in clothing,
education, and health and social services. Female-led rms tend to have a younger
and better educated labor force, and they employ predominantly females. Also,
9We will refer to this sample of rms as "all rms", in the tables and text that follow.
10Wages below half the national minimum wage or above 20 times the percentile 99 were dropped. Outliers in
wage growth (log wage change below -.5 or above 1.5) led to dropping the full history of the worker, since mistakes
coding the wage in one year usually lead to outliers in wage growth that carry over to the year afterwards (with
opposite sign), and thus the whole history of the worker was judged unreliable, even when not captured as an
outlier.
6the leadership of female-led rms is younger and better educated (see table 7 in
appendix). The share of female-led rms increased from approximately 13% in
1987 to 19% in 2000, whereas their employment share increased from 7% to 14%
over the period.
Figure 1 provides a visual description of the trend in wage policies for male-
and female-led rms.
Male-led rms pay on average higher wages than female-led rms, for both,
males (Panel A) and females (Panel B), which could be due to the dierent sectoral
composition, rm size and the education of the workforce. The gap between the
two types of rms seems to be larger for male workers. Panel C shows the aggregate
wages in male- and female-led rms; the higher dierential re
ects the gender-
based employment segregation: female-led rms employ females to a much larger
extent. Comparing Panels A and B shows that there is a large gender wage gap.
Average females' and males' wages are plotted in Panel D, which shows that the
raw gender wage gap in Portugal remained roughly stable over time.
4 Gender wage dierentials: can female-led rms make a
dierence?
To explore gender wage dierentials we use augmented Mincer-type (log) wage
regressions for males and females separately, concentrating in particular on the
in
uence of the gender of the manager as well as the segregation of the workforce.
Table 2 presents OLS estimates using all rms that changed ownership type only
once or never. Table 3 further includes rm xed eects to control for unobserved
and unobservable rm dierences which might in
uence wage setting. The impact
of female managers is identied now only by changes in the gender of the manager
within a rm. The summary tables provide a comparison of the most relevant
coecients estimated under alternative specications. The regressions additionally
include controls for age, tenure and education of the worker as well as size, industry,
region, legal setting and origin of the capital of the rm, and the year.11 A wider
set of estimated coecients is presented in the appendix, Tables 9 and 10, for our
11Note that in such a large dataset some rms are observed changing size, major industry, region, legal setting,
or the origin of their capital.
7preferred specication (wage regression with rm xed eects).
At rst sight, females do not seem to prot from having a female boss: Column
(1) in Table 2 shows a negative eect for females in female-led rms. We learn
from Column (2) that this result seems to be due to the fact that female-led rms
tend to have a higher share of females in the workforce. Correcting for this and
looking at the interaction eect (Column (3)), we see that female-led rms do pay
a premium to female workers of almost 5%, but this advantage becomes smaller
the more females there are in the rm. If 80% of the workforce is female, women
still earn a wage premium of 2% if they are led by a female boss, when compared
to a male boss.
For males, the impact of a female manager is denitely detrimental. In all
specications, males earn lower wages in female-led rms than in male-led rms.
Males get wages between three and seven percentage points lower in female-led
rms.
On the other hand, a larger share of female co-workers is associated with higher
males' wages. Our results conrm previous studies on segregation eects in Por-
tugal (Vieira et al. 2005): females get lower wages in rms with a predominantly
female workforce, whereas males enjoy higher wages, which might be interpreted
as an eect of segregation in tasks. Males do get the better jobs as supervisors or
middle managers: the more females there are around in the workplace, the better
are the chances for the isolated males to get promoted to a supervisor position
(Column 2). These eects are considerable: the male-female wage dierential in
an almost complete female workforce is 20% higher as compared to an almost full
male workforce.
But our results in Table 2 go beyond these insights. Distinguishing between
female- and male-led rms, we nd (Column 3) that the overall pattern just de-
scribed { a larger share of female co-workers having a positive impact on males'
wages and a negative impact on females' wages { holds in male-led rms, whereas
in female-led rms both males and females earn lower wages the larger the propor-
tion of female workers. This result could be due to structural dierences between
rms with a male- vs. female-dominated workforce.
Combining the eect of female managers and female workforce, we see that
8women can get less mentoring and protection by a female boss if there are many
female coworkers around. For males, the detrimental impact of a female boss is
amplied if there is also a female dominance in the rm's workforce: in a rm with
50% females, males working under a female manager have 8 percent lower wages;
in a rm with 80% female workforce, they lose almost 11%.
Although we do control for a wide set of variables, the OLS results might suer
from a bias if male- and female-led rms dier according to unobserved characteris-
tics. Therefore, we recourse to rm-xed eects estimates. These results, in Table
3, conrm our main insights: females prot from a female boss and males lose
out. Already Column 1 { disregarding the gender-composition of the workforce {
shows a clear picture: females gain 2% whereas males lose 2%; thus a female boss
is reducing the wage gap by 4%. Extending the analysis by considering also the
composition of the workforce, we see that the results for females' wages are almost
unchanged as compared to the OLS results, whereas for males' wages, the eects
are still present, but somewhat smaller.
Our results are compatible with a model where job assignment and job pro-
motion are important factors determining wages. If employers decide about pro-
moting workers according to the expected duration of stay in the rm, the fear of
pregnancy-related quits might lead to statistical discrimination of females (Lazear
and Rosen, 1990, Winter-Ebmer and Zweim uller, 1997). As there is in general a
xed number of such supervisory jobs, the higher the number of potential candi-
dates, the less likely it is that an individual person can get this job. This would
explain the pattern that in male managed rms a higher share of females has a
positive impact on males' wages and a negative one on females' wages: as females
are discriminated against in promotion decisions, the higher the share of females,
the less likely it is that one of them gets promoted; on the other hand, more females
make it easier for each individual male to nish rst in male-led rms.
Female managers might either have better information about expected preg-
nancies or about following work interruptions or they might simply want to break
through this logic by mentoring females better in order to promote them to super-
visory or foreman jobs. If females do protect fellow-females in promotion decisions,
this would explain the positive eect of female managers on females' wages and
9the negative eect on males' wages. The consequence is that a higher female share
in the rm reduces the chances for an individual woman to grab one of these rare
jobs; the average wage of females must be lower. Likewise, for males, a higher
share of females in the rm is increasing the competition for the remaining males
and reduce their chances.
4.1 Robustness checks
Our main results from xed eects regressions showed that female managers are
indeed able to mentor and promote female workers, but the possibilities for men-
torship get weaker the more female co-workers there are around. Here we report
two robustness checks by changing the selection of our samples. The rst con-
cerns only new rms, whereas the second allows more time for changes in the
management to take its impact on pay scales.
In Table 4 results for newly founded rms are shown. We consider one single
year of observation for each rm, the year the rm was created.12 It is highly likely
that incumbent rms will have an established pay scale: if there are discriminatory
aspects in these pay scales, it can be assumed that many aspects of these pay scales
might be persistent { even persisting a change in management. One could assume
that newly founded rms would set a pay scale which is much more reactive to
current economic and social considerations, and in particular female managers may
nd it easier to escape traditional gender-based payment rules.
The results for newly founded rms do conrm these expectations. Whereas
the main pattern is unchanged and for male workers the parameters are almost
identical, female workers do prot to a much higher extent from having female
bosses. Comparable female workers in newly founded female-led rms earn sig-
nicantly higher wages than those in newly founded male-led rms. If half of the
workforce is female, the gain is 8.5%; it is still 4% if only 20% males are among
the coworkers.
In our second robustness check we included all the rms in our sample, regard-
less whether they changed gender of their leadership once or more often. However,
given that changes implemented by the new management may take some time to
12Note that we can only report OLS results here, since the inclusion of a rm xed eect wipes out the dummy
variable of female management.
10have an impact, we have excluded the year the rm changed type of leadership
and the subsequent year from the analysis. Results are reported in Table 5. Also
in this case, results are very consistent with the ones previously reported.
5 Conclusion
In contrast to the textbook model of perfect competition, employers can in
uence
pay setting and the structure of pay in non-perfect markets. This should also apply
to gender-based pay. Starting with Becker (1957) economists embraced the idea
that pay dierences between men and women could be explained by a taste for
discrimination by a part of the employers. Depending on the extent of this distaste
and the number of discriminating employers, a gender wage gap will materialize
in equilibrium.
In this paper we look at a potential role the gender of the employer or manager
could play. Using a large longitudinal data set for Portugal we show that, indeed,
a female-led rm is paying higher wages to females but lower ones to males. These
results are robust to a set of specication tests: we identify the eect only by
rms who changed the gender of the manager in order to control for unobserved
rm-specic features; we used only start-up rms to allow for a newly decided
pay structure; and we also used rms who changed management more often. Our
results are consistent with a situation where job promotion is an important part
of the pay scale and the number of such supervisory jobs is limited. When female
managers are actively mentoring and protecting female co-workers they increase
their promotion chances and thus the expected wage for females. The higher
the share of females in the rm is, the lower are the promotion changes for an
individual person, both female and male. This is exactly what we nd. While
being an important factor in the structure of male-female wages, the rise in female-
led rms in Portugal is too small to contribute signicantly to the development of
the overall gender wage gap.
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14Tables and gures
panel A, males' wages panel B, females' wages
panel C, both gender panel D
Figure 1: Monthly wages (male, female, and overall). Source: Computations based on
Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Notes: Panels A to C: the average real monthly wage at the rm level
(male, female, and overall) was averaged for the two groups of rms using as weights the male, female,
and overall employment in the rm, respectively; log wages are plotted. Panel D: the average real
monthly wage for males and females was computed; log wages are plotted.
15Criterion Female-led Male-led Insuf. info.(*)
Owners 23,372 131,778 231,218
Top managers 24,442 138,398 223,528
Middle managers 33,791 178,584 173,993
Top wages 83,666 298,680 4,022
Table 1: Successive criteria used to identify the firm leadership and its degree of
femaleness. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note (*): Information on
the criterion either missing or pointing exactly to half males and half females in the rm leadership.
16A: Female Workers (1) (2) (3)









fem.-led * share fem. -.033
(.002)

Obs. 2903728 2903728 2903728
R2 .698 .700 .700
F statistic 131355.2 130511.4 128064.6
B: Male Workers









fem.-led * share fem. -.096
(.003)

Obs. 5800455 5800455 5800455
R2 .632 .632 .632
F statistic 195286.2 191763.3 188202.3
Table 2: Summary of wage regression, ordinary least squares, all firms. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and
education of the worker, size, industry, region, legal setting, and origin of the capital of the rm, and
year.
17A: Female Workers (1) (2) (3)









fem.-led * share fem. -.039
(.003)

Obs. 2903728 2903728 2903728
R2 .801 .801 .801
F statistic 37258.46 36590.22 35904.98
B: Male Workers





share females -.0009 .001
(.002) (.002)
fem.-led * share fem. -.037
(.004)

Obs. 5800455 5800455 5800455
R2 .749 .749 .749
F statistic 82920.8 81326.16 79794.21
Table 3: Summary of wage regression, firm fixed effects, all firms. Source: Compu-
tations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of
the worker, size, industry, region, legal setting, and origin of the capital of the rm, and year.
18A: Female Workers (1) (2) (3)









fem.-led * share fem. -.150
(.013)

Obs. 46183 46183 46183
R2 .585 .594 .595
F statistic 1276.378 1299.719 1281.31
B:Male Workers









fem.-led * share fem. -.104
(.020)

Obs. 53987 53987 53987
R2 .514 .515 .515
F statistic 1120.46 1099.208 1079.49
Table 4: Summary of wage regression, ordinary least squares, just new firms.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for age, tenure
and education of the worker, size, industry, region, legal setting, and origin of the capital of the rm,
and year.
19A: Female Workers (1) (2) (3)









fem.-led * share fem. -.009
(.004)

Obs. 2778685 2778685 2778685
R2 .804 .804 .804
F statistic 36049.65 35399.9 34732.11
B: Male Workers





share females -.0004 .0007
(.002) (.002)
fem.-led * share fem. -.025
(.006)

Obs. 5698156 5698156 5698156
R2 .75 .75 .75
F statistic 81970.29 80393.92 78877.64
Table 5: Summary of wage regression, firm fixed effects, excluding year t when
firm changed type of leadership and year t+1. Source: Computations based on Portugal,
MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of the worker, size, industry,
region, legal setting, and origin of the capital of the rm, and year.
20Appendix A: Additional tables
Firm size restriction Workers Firms Owners Female owners
No size restriction 17,116,973 1,457,183 1,192,282 302,265
Firms ever larger than 10 workers 13,202,761 386,368 297,982 63,291
Table 6: Initial sample sizes (number of unit-year observations). Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000).
21Male-led Firms Female-led Firms
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
rm size (log) 2.675 1.091 2.416 0.964
rm age 23.734 19.279 22.271 36.287
share females 0.251 0.251 0.806 0.268
av. age 35.832 6.144 33.735 6.699
av. schooling (yrs) 6.276 2.346 6.919 2.521
av. age rm leader 43.181 9.816 37.713 10.221
av. schooling rm leader 8.198 4.329 9.138 4.54
rm productivity (log) 9.733 1.103 9.002 1.279
Legal setting
sole proprietorship 0.071 0.112
partnership 0.8 0.611






Center Coast 0.185 0.126
Lisbon 0.354 0.35
Inland and South 0.128 0.124
Industry
textiles 0.035 0.048
clothing, leather 0.062 0.264
wood, cork 0.072 0.018
paper, printing 0.028 0.012
chemicals 0.025 0.01
stone, clay, glass 0.037 0.015
basic metals 0.008 0.001
metal prod, machin. 0.108 0.021
elect., water 0.001 0
construction 0.169 0.029
wholesale trade 0.122 0.053
retail trade 0.104 0.09
restaurants, hotels 0.052 0.044
transport, communic. 0.039 0.016
banking, insurance 0.011 0.004
real estate 0.02 0.02
education 0.008 0.102
health, social serv. 0.006 0.168
other 0.051 0.068
N 222966 42733
Table 7: Descriptive statistics on the firm. Source: Own
computations based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1987-2000. Note: Reports
rms that changed ownership type once or never.
22Males Females
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
wage(log) 11.769 0.53 11.488 0.48
female-led rm 0.034 0.18 0.208 0.406
share females 0.207 0.19 0.576 0.283
age 38.104 11.64 34.116 10.421
tenure 9.989 9.509 8.214 8.388
tenure< =1 0.127 0.138
Education
4 yrs 0.475 0.399
6 yrs 0.19 0.212
9 yrs 0.115 0.128
12 yrs 0.126 0.165
16 yrs 0.055 0.061
rm size (log) 4.976 2.115 4.588 1.857
rm age 41.281 24.056 37.671 32.61
Legal setting
sole proprietorship 0.024 0.028
partnership 0.51 0.561






Center Coast 0.135 0.154
Lisbon 0.482 0.413
Inland and South 0.079 0.091
Industry
textiles 0.051 0.106
clothing, leather 0.029 0.193
wood, cork 0.048 0.033
paper, printing 0.024 0.019
chemicals 0.039 0.028
stone, clay, glass 0.04 0.028
basic metals 0.018 0.004
metal prod, machin. 0.14 0.08
elect., water 0.027 0.009
construction 0.151 0.018
wholesale trade 0.081 0.067
retail trade 0.057 0.067
restaurants, hotels 0.025 0.049
transport, communic. 0.103 0.045
banking, insurance 0.058 0.048
real estate 0.013 0.012
education 0.004 0.03
health, social serv. 0.004 0.058
other 0.045 0.051
N 5800455 2903728
Table 8: Descriptive statistics on the worker
23(1) (2) (3)









fem.-led * share fem. -.039
(.003)







































































foreign .001 .0007 .0006
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Obs. 2903728 2903728 2903728
R2 .801 .801 .801
F statistic 37258.46 36590.22 35904.98
Table 9: Wage regression, firm fixed effects, female workers, all firms. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for industry (19 dummies),
year, and region (3 dummies).
24(1) (2) (3)





share females -.0009 .001
(.002) (.002)
fem.-led * share fem. -.037
(.004)












































































Obs. 5800455 5800455 5800455
R2 .749 .749 .749
F statistic 82920.8 81326.16 79794.21
Table 10: Wage regression, firm fixed effects, male workers, all firms. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Includes controls for industry (19 dummies),
year, and region (3 dummies).
25Appendix B: Alternative procedure to identify the rm lead-
ership
We have checked the robustness of our classication of rms into male- and female-
led. Whereas the rst criterion used to dene the rm leadership { its owner {
raises no doubts, the order in which the other variables are considered may be less
consensual, and one could argue for instance that the best paid worker is more
likely to be the rm leader, even if (s)he is not formally called a manager. We have
therefore identied the person leading the rm using the criteria in the following
alternative sequence: 1. Owner of the rm; 2. Top wage in the rm; 3. Top
manager; 4. Middle manager. Table 11 reports the cross-classication using the
two procedures.
Procedure 2
Procedure 1 Male-led Female-led Insuf. info. Total
Male-led 296,031 2,649 298,680
Female-led 3,810 79,856 83,666
Insuf. info. 4,022 4,022
Total 299,841 82,505 4,022 386,368
Table 11: Classification of firms into male- and female-led using alternative pro-
cedures. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987-2000). Note: Procedure 1 uses
the following ordering of variables to identify the rm leader(s): owner, manager, best wage in rm;
procedure 2 uses the ordering: owner, best wage in rm, manager.
Almost all the rms (99%) classied as male-headed under procedure 1 get the
same classication under procedure 2: for female-headed rms, that share is 95%.
The two procedures lead to a very similar classications of rms. Nonetheless it
is more plausible that a worker reported as manager will take the crucial decisions
in the company { including setting the pay scales { as compared to a specialized
worker whose wage may be very high due to market constraints.13 Indeed, it is a
standard procedure in the literature to identify the rm leadership by looking at
the top executive jobs (Bell, 2005) (Smith et al, 2005) (Melero, 2004). We have
therefore progressed in the analysis using the rst procedure described, but results
using the second procedure are very similar.
13In rms that have top managers, wages higher than his(hers) occur for occupations such as accountants,
professionals of intermediate level in nancial and commercial services, and salespersons.
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